 
In the case of Douglas Daugherty v. The City of Maryland Heights, the Missouri Supreme Court, in a 2007
decision, established a new standard for summary judgment in discrimination cases under state law. Under the facts of the case, Mr. Daugherty
was seriously injured on the job by a drunk driver in 1986. Fourteen (14) years later, in 2000, he missed months of work when he alleged the
necessity for back surgery for degenerative spine disease relating to the prior event. This also necessitated an increased use of sick leave
and alleged violations of leave policies, which the City represented was the reason for the termination. The employee was told he was terminated
because he failed to meet the physical tasks required of front line officers. Mr. Daugherty disputed the claims and countered with the argument
that there was no evidence showing that he failed to complete the essential functions of his job duties.
Judge Drumm, of the St. Louis Country Circuit Court, entered summary judgment on the employee’s discrimination case in favor of the Defendant City. The
reason the case is significant is the result on appeal.
The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff must meet a “new standard” (emphasis supplied) to survive summary judgment for discrimination claims. The
Missouri Supreme Court said that plaintiffs need only prove that the discrimination was a “contributing factor” in the employee’s termination. Plaintiffs
heretofore, to carry their burden of proof, had to convince the finder of fact that the discrimination was motivating or determining factor in the
termination. Prior to that, under Missouri common law, Plaintiff(s) were required to prove that the alleged discrimination was the exclusive cause of the
employee’s termination. These fundamental distinctions are an essential element of any final judicial determination.
The Daugherty case was reversed and remanded because there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the termination was discriminatory. As
such, it is clear that employees taking legal action in discrimination cases have the right to a jury trial in State court. The decision has also acted as
precedent when in March 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the same standard outline in Daugherty to retaliation claims in the case of Cynthia Hill v.
Ford Motor Company.
Related to this subject matter is an important decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in April, 2009, pertaining to the individual discrimination claims
of bargaining unit employees. The issue is whether employee right under such statutes as the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, can be bargained away by an employee’s union and employer during the collective
bargaining negotiations, and then be resolved in the grievance and arbitration procedure, as opposed to leaving the employees free to bring their own
discrimination cases in the public courts. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, reversed its own previous case law and concluded that unions
can agree in a collective bargaining context, to waive the employee’s right to bring their individual statutory discrimination claims to court and instead,
require such claims to only be pursued under the union contract, in its negotiated grievance and arbitration provisions. The majority of the Court found
that this issue is a mandatory subject for bargaining, which now allows an employer to bargain to impasse in order to include such provisions in the union
contract. It is obvious that this decision will lead to increased economic activity between labor and management.
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